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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
DISSENT OF COMMISSIONER J. CLAY SMITH, JR., RE: 
THE SEPTEMBER 16, 1980 VOTE OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION~ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
APPEAL NO. 80-7-FOIA-3b7 
t 
On Tuesday, September 16, 1980 the Equal Employment 
Opportunity COFMission voted to de~y a Freedom of Information 
;. , j . 
Act Appeal (hereinafter FOIA) requesting certain documents 
which pertained to a policy determination on the issue of con-
tribution. Among the documents requested and which the majority 
of the Commission voted not to release was my dissent of July 7, 
1980 outlining my reasons for opposing the positions taken by 
the Commission on the issues of contribution under the Equal 
Pay Act and under Title VII at a Commission meeting on July 1, 
1980. Because I strongly believe that every Co~issioner has 
the inherent right to explain his or her vote on matters in-
volving policy considered in either open or closed session, I 
/ 
must respectfully dissent from the majority's decisio~ to deny 
relea~e of my earlier dissent. I therefore believe my dis~ent 
issued on July 7, 1980 should be released."; 
': t~ 
" Background 
For over two years, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has been participating in a case involving the issue 
of contribution. Three months ago the Supreme Court voted to 
hear this case and at that time the Court also suggested that 
the government file a brief on the contribution issue. 
*Comrnissioner Ethel B. Walsh," abstaining. 
-- --- ... 
~--..• ~---"-
• 
, .... 2. 
The Commi~sion's General Counsel brought the issue of 
! 
contribution under Title VII before the Commission's Steering 
Committee on EEOC Policies (SeEP) for a full and vigorous pre-
decisional agency policy discussion. The issue was also brought 
'" be!ore the Co~ission at a meeting, July 1, 1980 for a vote ,on 
~ 
the broad policy issue stated above. I voted against the 
Commission changing its position to opposing contribution. 
Since the Commission majority's v~ews would later be communi-
cated through a draft brief to the Solicitor General, I filed 
a dissent to be associated with the official minutes as a public 
document and directed that my dissent be transmitted to the 
Solicitor General along with the'majority's brief. 
Persons interested in :th,e policy determination on the 
issue of contribution have now requested certain Commission 
I ' 
documents on the contribution issue under the Freedom of 
Infor.mation.Act. I am of the opinion that the dissent of July 7, 
f 
1980 outlining my views on contribution should be released. 
Argument 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is composed 
of five individuals appointed by the President of the United 
States and confirmed by the Senate. The policy of the Commission 
is set by these five'individuals voting on items brought before. 
them. Each Commissioner has one vote. 
--. -------_. 
· . 
3. 
As I men~ioned earlier, tpe Commission on July 1, 1980 
- t 
t 
voted to oppose the right of contribution by emp'loyers ~'9ainst unions 
under Title VII. I voted against this position but, I believe 
that it was necessary and would be more meaningful to explain 
"' 
my.vote by iS$u~ng a dissenting opinion. setting forth my 
i 
policy differences with the majority. My dissent should be 
released for the simple reason that the right to explain one's 
vote is inextricably tied to the ,right to vote itself. The 
right to explain is pe~sonal, the prerogative of the individual 
casting the vote, and on matters-resulting in the crystallization 
of agency policy cannot and should not be abridged by the majority. 
Release of my dissent is particularly compelling in this case 
since the Commission reverseq:a policy position it had cUltivated 
for two years. The purpose of my dissent was to explain to the / . 
public why I opposed this policy shift. 
I believe that the General Counsel's characterization of 
.. 
the July 1st Commission vote on contribution as a vote on a 
legal matter was erroneous and does not provide a legal basis for 
withholding release of the dissent. All the evidence establishes 
that the Commission's vote on contribution was in fact a policy 
determination and did not involve litigation strategy. The issue 
before the Commission at the July 1st meeting was simple--whether 
to file a brief supporting contribution or whether to file a 
brief opposing this principle. Policy considerations predominated 
the discussion leading to the ultimate vote. Indeed, the 
--------------.-. • ...--.,....,.- -----;:=-=---_ ... ,--. ~: :-~.~ .... ---:::::.:.:==~ -.-_ ....... --- -_. -"-. -.~'.-=--'-
'. '. . 4'. 
Commission's own conduct on the contribution vote establishes 
.,. 
the policy character of the issue. Legal strategy and trial 
tactics issues are within the domain of the General Counsel's 
office and therefore are not brought before SeEP. The issue 
of contributi~n, however, was brought. to SeEP, not for discussion I . . .'
~ 
of legal strategies, but to weigh the merits of favoring or 
opposing contribution. 
The procedural posture of the case in which the contribu-
tion issue arose also establishes the policy character of the 
vote. The Supreme Court requested the government to file a 
brief on the issue of contribution. The Commission's vote deter-
mined only what conclusion the proposed brief would say--whether 
EEOC favored or opposed contribution. Since the EEOC was not a 
party to the suit, but had already been participating as an amicus 
in the case for over two and a half years, no litigation strategy 
was involved. Cumulatively these arguments establish the policy 
charac·ter o'f the Commission vote on contribution. 
It is also significant to this discussion to emphasize 
that "the FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requires that the 
disclosure requirement be construed broadly, the exemption narrowly,n 
Vaughn v. Rose, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. eire 1975). I believe this 
holding was ignored by chracterizing my dissent on contribution 
as a vote on a legal matter thereby est'ablishing a justification 
to withhold its release. 
_____ ~------:---- .. -0'-'-' -----. _-~- --- --- #_---.".--;;-.. "E0 --. 
". .. s. 
Finally', let me put to rest .the argument that the release 
of my dissent is inherently· untair to the majority since they 
t 
have no corresponding vehicle for dissemination of their opinions • 
• 
The rebuttal to this is obvious; the majority, if it so chooses, 
can address tQe points the dissen~ raises. If anything is in-
~..-
~ 
herently unfair", it is the present i;ituation where the majority 
can muzzle the minority and create the appearance that an agency 
governed by a collegial and politically constituted body speaks 
monolithically, when in fact among equal Commissioners there is 
disagreement ~ver a policy matter. Indeed, since any vote by 
a Commissioner counts as much as any other Commissioner, there 
must be an institutional mechanism for the public to know the 
extent and details of those opposing the majority, unless a 
dissenting view is the prope'rty right of the "Star Chamber. n 
The majority's views/are expresse~ in the item they approved--
in this case, the position to be taken in the draft brief to be 
submitted to the Solicitor General for filing in the Supreme Court. 
Thus, here, if my dissent cn contribution were released,· and the 
majority who voted to oppose contribution felt a rejoinder to it 
we~.e neces·sa~:,. :they· wbuld' 'have ~the. ·o.ption o;f issu·i~g· a .statement point-
i~9 out deficiencies in my dissent or alternatively they could 
even release the draft brief, The :fact of the matter is that 
because the majority need not justify~its position, they have 
4 • 
decided to forbid a dis'senter from utilizi~9 an institutional 
vehfcle within the Commis·sion to p.ubl·ica·l·lY· j.ust·i"fy~ his pos-i~j.on • 
.. ----.-------------.---~~ --p-~~ .. - .. ~ -.-~ 
~ . 
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6. 
! 
I respectfully dissent, and direct that this dissent be 
made part of the official minutes of the Commission. 
:t 
r. 
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